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FORUM: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN THE SHADOW OF BREXIT 
 
“Brexit means Brexit” turned into the mantra of Theresa May’s government, when she became 
the UK’s new Prime Minister in the wake of the outcome of the referendum on 23 June 2016 
on British membership in the European Union (EU) (Cowburn, 2016). She wanted to make 
clear that the referendum result was final and that there was no backdoor option for the UK to 
remain in the EU. However, even months after the referendum, it has not become clear how 
the process of leaving the EU will be implemented in practice and what the likely implications 
will be – in the UK, in the EU and in the wider world. In other words, what Brexit actually 
means has remained unanswered. This uncertainty has remained the dominant feature of the 
Brexit process. It is particularly pronounced in areas that are not at the heart of the public 
debate, even though they are traditionally a major concern of nation states. Security and 
defence is the prime example in this regard. Whereas the twin topics of British access to the 
EU’s single market and the free movement of persons between the UK and the EU have seen 
a myriad of publications, security and defence has been largely confined to the analyses by 
issue experts (Dijkstra, 2016). 
 
The overall objective of this forum is to shed light on the possible implications of Brexit in the 
under-researched area of security and defence. This is clearly a challenging task. A brief survey 
of the publications on this topic before and after the referendum shows that expert opinions are 
still far away from any kind of consensus. On one end of the spectrum, a few experts have 
raised alarmist voices. For instance, Hugh Gusterson (2016) has argued in the prestigious 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that “Those who voted for a ‘Brexit,’ with the avowed goal of 
‘making Britain great again,’ may have set in motion a course of events that will result in 
Britain’s unilateral nuclear disarmament.” Spyros Economides and Julia Himmrich (2016) 
have foreseen “disastrous” consequences for the transatlantic alliance and Western cohesion. 
On the other end of the spectrum, several authors are much less concerned about the 
implications of Brexit on security and defence, even though they might not see any security 
gains due to Brexit either (Inkster, 2016; Menon, 2016). In the words of Richard Whitman 
(2016b), “security and defence is an area in which the impact of a vote to leave the EU would 
be relatively marginal” (p. 254). Along this spectrum other opinions and analyses exist, many 
of which emphasize broader Brexit implications in terms of security and defence. This includes 
the consequences of Brexit for the UK’s strategy as an international actor (Niblett, 2015; 
Whitman, 2016a), Europe’s geostrategic weight (Simón, 2015) and European stability 
(Heisbourg, 2016). More recently, a few experts have also come up with pragmatic proposals 
to maintain the cooperation between the UK and the EU after Brexit (Dijkstra, 2016; Witney, 
2016), though their implementation is far from assured. In sum, this wide variety of opinions 
and analyses shows that uncertainty about the implications of Brexit on security and defence 
has not vanished. As Lawrence Freedman (2016) wrote in an article shortly before the 
referendum, “With so little clarity on what Brexit is intended to achieve, it is hard to think of a 
greater test of the law of unintended consequences” (p. 11). 
 
From a methodological perspective, the uncertainty is hardly surprising. Most notably, there is 
virtually no event to which Brexit could be compared to. Another important methodological 
limitation is the complexity of the multilevel negotiations that Brexit entails. Especially an area 
such as security and defence remains contingent upon the developments in many other areas, 
not least the single market and the free movement of persons. The limited access to primary 
sources in the form of written documents such as negotiation briefings and of elite interviews 
with key policy-makers in what is at the end of the day a highly political issue is yet another 
limitation. Consequently, the articles in this forum do not intend to “predict” any concrete 
developments or outcomes in the area of security and defence. They steer away from unfounded 
speculations and adopt a more modest, though arguably equally important approach. Drawing 
on the expertise of each of the issue specialists who writes the individual forum articles, they 
offer judgements and observations grounded in deep understanding of pre-Brexit trends and 
dynamics in European foreign, security and defence affairs. They look specifically at the two 
major security and defence actors in the EU, namely France and Germany, and their 
cooperation in the area of defence procurement. Moreover, they also examine Brexit from the 
perspective of Europe’s main partners (and rivals) in the wider world, in particular Russia and 
the United States in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this way, 
the forum maintains a decidedly global outlook and addresses the main concerns raised in the 
EU’s new Global Strategy. The Strategy states specifically that “We live in times of existential 
crisis, within and beyond the European Union.” (European Union, 2016). Increasing our 
understanding of major underlying foreign, security and defence developments in the light of 
Brexit will help tackle this “existential crisis” more effectively. 
 
Although each forum article examines a different aspect of European security and defence, a 
number of broad themes can be identified running through the forum. First, and as already 
alluded to, is a high degree of uncertainty over the future shape of European security and 
defence in the absence of the UK from the EU. As Mark Webber and David Dunn note, while 
Britain will remain a key member of NATO, uncertainty over the UK’s economic growth post-
Brexit casts a shadow over whether the UK will be able to keep to its current commitment to 
spend 2% of GDP on defence. There is also a high degree of uncertainty over what future path 
Scotland will choose. Matthew Uttley and Ben Wilkinson argue that the future of defence 
procurement policies in Europe is contingent upon the UK’s access to the EU’s single market. 
Uncertainty also permeates the analysis of Anglo-French relations in the context of Brexit. 
Alice Pannier observes that although the UK has strong incentives to invest more heavily in 
Anglo-French defence cooperation, it is less likely that France will do so, whose interests may 
lie in investing in a renewed Paris-Berlin axis at the heart of the EU. However, uncertainty 
features less prominently as a theme in the articles by Tracey German on UK-Russian relations 
and Inez von Weitershausen’s article on Germany, both of whom predict, by and large, a 
continuation of pre-existing trends. 
 
Second, a number of authors foresee a reasonable risk that Britain will be marginalised within 
Europe – and potentially, international politics more widely. As noted by Mark Webber and 
David Dunn, even if the UK retains its nuclear status and maintains the NATO benchmark of 
2% GDP in defence spending, by taking itself out of the European Union it risks imposing a 
self-inflicted isolation within the context of growing EU-NATO cooperation; this in turn is 
likely to have a negative impact on its relationship with Washington which has valued the UK’s 
role as the “tough guy in the EU.” NATO is also part of a wider transatlantic community, and 
in removing itself from the EU, the UK risks undermining not only NATO’s internal cohesion 
but the spirit of “togetherness” which has sustained the transatlantic community. In the area of 
defence procurement, Matthew Uttley and Ben Wilkinson highlight important post-Brexit 
trade-offs that leave the UK in a potentially more precarious situation: either being without a 
strong voice in EU defence procurement policies if it stays in the single market or being 
excluded from the European defence market if it stays out of the single market. Should Paris 
and Berlin, as Alice Pannier and Inez von Weitershausen suggest, seek to consolidate and 
enhance France and Germany’s positions as Europe’s leading powers, the UK will find itself 
further marginalised, with less leverage to influence the shape of European security and 
defence. In addition, Russia, as Tracey German observes, is only likely to seek to exploit a lack 
of unity within Europe for its own gain, and has seized on Brexit as an opportunity to further 
disparage both the EU and UK. 
 
Third, and notwithstanding the previous points, although Brexit may have very real 
implications in the realm of European security and defence, it is likely to reinforce existing 
trends and dynamics rather than leading to their reversal. The renewed emphasis on NATO 
only reinforces existing defence assumptions which envisage NATO at the heart of UK 
defence; the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, Mark Webber and David Dunn 
observe, was always largely inconsequential to UK defence policy. For Matthew Uttley and 
Ben Wilkinson the post-Brexit debate on defence procurement in Europe is still largely a 
reflection of the “age-old tensions between sovereignty and integration” and is, thus, “old wine 
in new bottles.” Further, UK-Russian relations are driven by a long-standing and complex 
dynamic of competition and cooperation. As Tracey German argues even with the UK set to 
depart the EU, Russia’s long-standing suspicion that the West is seeking to constrain Russia 
will not be affected by the UK’s decision, the relationship likely to be one characterised by 
high levels of mistrust particularly at the political and diplomatic level. One issue where we 
may see a reversal of existing dynamics is in the Anglo-French defence partnership. Alice 
Pannier suggests that where previously France has been the more “pro-active” partner in the 
relationship, Brexit may reverse this; France may well, as noted earlier, increasingly look 
towards cementing relations with Berlin while it is left to the UK to seek to elevate the 
partnership as it looks towards enhancing bilateral relations with key powers. Still, in the 
months following Brexit both the UK and France have insisted the partnership will be 
preserved suggesting that here, as elsewhere, the fundamentals will not change. As far as 
Germany, Europe’s leading power, is concerned, Inez von Weitershausen foresees that trends 
already discernible pre-Brexit, notably Germany’s move away from a “culture of restraint” in 
in its foreign and defence policy, and towards greater self-confidence and military engagement, 
will likely continue. 
 
Indeed, it is by setting Brexit within a wider context, one that establishes pre-existing trends 
and dynamics, that each of the authors is able to make reasoned judgements about what the 
future may hold, without recourse to the kinds of hyperbole and speculation that has prevailed 
in some parts of the media and wider commentary on Brexit. As a result, and despite the 
uncertainty that prevails – and which will no doubt continue for some time – there is much that 
will remain familiar and unchanging. In the words of Aldous Huxley (1952/2005), “The charm 
of history and its enigmatic lesson consist in the fact that, from age to age, nothing changes and 
yet everything is completely different” (p. 300). 
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